ABSTRACT Cyber-security issues have generated a surge of interests in recent years. In order to understand the behavior of potential attackers, one needs to investigate the malicious attacks from the viewpoint of an invader. In this paper, an optimal linear attack is considered for a cyber physical system with multiplicative noise. A linear attack is proposed first and the feasibility of launching a successful attack without being detected is analyzed. In addition, the estimation error covariance is derived under the proposed linear attack. Furthermore, the optimal attack strategy is transformed into difference of convex programming problems. Finally, a simulation example is presented to demonstrate the obtained results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber physical systems (CPSs) are composed of communication, computation to monitor, coordinate and control physical processes. Since CPSs have a wide spectrum of applications such as smart buildings, smart grids and intelligent transportation, the study on CPSs has received a boom of interests in recent years [1] - [6] . However, the communication between each part of CPS is through wireless communication network and the use of wireless communication network has made the wireless channel be vulnerable to cyber attacks [7] , [8] . Thus, cyber security becomes a fundamental issue for CPSs [9] - [17] . Any successful attacks may cause great damage. For example, a cyber worm called ''stuxnet" attacked industrial control systems, which resulted in 60% host damage [18] . In order to understand the behavior of potential attackers, one needs to investigate malicious attacks from the viewpoint of an invader.
A variety of efforts have been devoted to studying cyber attacks in CPSs. Generally speaking, two classes of attacks, are studied, that is, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and integrity attacks. The DoS attack is that an invader blocks the communication of data between system components instead of modifying the data directly. In [19] , the optimal DoS attack with energy constraint is studied for a wireless networked control system. Li et al. [20] used a game-theoretic approach to investigate a DoS attack for CPSs. Optimal decisions for both the sensor and the attacker, which is a Nash equilibrium of both sides, are studied under a game-theoretic framework. A DoS attack problem in the scenario of centralized state estimation is investigated in [21] . Under the resource constraint that an invader cannot attack all the sensors and should decide which one to attack, attack strategies are presented by solving a convex optimization problem.
The integrity attack is that an invader has the ability to modify the data and send a false one to the system, which doesn't undermine the integrity of the data. A false data injection attack is investigated in [22] , in which an attacker modifies the value of a static state and injects an additional vector. A linear deception attack is studied and an optimal attack strategy is provided by analyzing a convex optimization problem [23] . A special class of deception attack named as replay attack is considered, where the invader records the sensor data for some time and then uses the recorded data to replace the sensor data. In [24] , the feasibility of a replay attack is analyzed and the detection problem of such an attack is studied.
Although some interesting results have been obtained in cyber security problems, the above mentioned results only consider the case of additive noises and multiplicative noises have been ignored. In fact, multiplicative noise is useful to model the phenomena such as fading, or reflection of the transmitted signal from the ionospheric channel [25] . Since the signal contaminated by multiplicative noises is very common, the study of dynamical systems with multiplicative noises has attracted a lot of attention from many research fields such as communication systems and image processing, etc [26] - [29] . Note that, multiplicative noise is usually unavoidable such as [25] - [29] , however, there is no result about cyber security problem for a CPS with multiplicative noise so far, to the best of our knowledge. Thus, for the purpose of understanding the influence of multiplicative noise and the optimal attack, and provide an effective countermeasure, it is necessary to consider the problems of cyber attack for a CPS with multiplicative noise.
Motivated by the above discussion, in this paper, an optimal deception attack is considered for a CPS with multiplicative and additive noises. The main difficulty of studying an optimal deception attack for a CPS with multiplicative noise is two-fold. First, the calculation of the estimation error covariance is complicated. Since there is an attacker who modifies the innovation, the estimation error covariance needs to be recalculated. In addition, the multiplicative noise is coupled with the system state and the classical Kalman filter cannot be used, which makes the derivation of the estimation error covariance difficult. Second, it is challenging to give the optimal attack strategy. In fact, the optimal attack problem needs to be converted into an optimization problem. How to convert the optimal attack problem into an optimization problem that can be solved numerically is tough. In this paper, we will overcome these difficulties and give an optimal solution of a deception attack for a CPS with multiplicative noise.
The main contributions of this paper are shown as follows. In this paper, we overcome the difficulty that multiplicative noises bring in, such as the failure of classical Kalman filter, and the difficulty of transforming into a solvable optimization problem. The optimal linear attack problem is studied for a CPS with multiplicative noises for the first time. To be specific, (i) The covariance of estimation error should be recalculated since there is an attacker who modifies the innovation and the classical Kalman filter cannot be used.
(ii) How to bypass the bad measurement detector is analyzed such that the attacker cannot be detected by the detector. (iii) An optimal linear attack strategy is given by converting it into DC programming problem which can be solved numerically.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The problem formulation is presented in section II. The feasibility of launching a linear attack without being detected is analyzed and the optimal attack strategy is provided in section III. A simulation example is given in section IV. Some concluding remarks are given in section V. An appendix is presented in the end to revisit the derivation of the Kalman filter for a CPS with multiplicative noise and present some proofs of the theorems in this paper to aid the readers.
Notations: N and R denote the sets of all natural numbers and real numbers, respectively. Denote by R n the n-dimensional Euclidean space. S n + (and S n ++ ) is the set of n × n positive semi-definite matrices (and positive definite matrices). For X ∈ S n + (and S n ++ ), it means that X ≥ 0 (and
is the spectral radius for a matrix. Denote by E[X ] the mathematical expectation of X and Pr{A} the probability of A. N (µ, ) stands for Gaussian distribution with mean µ and covariance matrix . Denote by tr(·) the trace of a matrix and the superscript T the transposition. For functions f , f 1 , f 2 with appropriate domain, f 1 • f 2 (x) is the function composition f 1 (f 2 (x)), and f n (x) f (f n−1 (x)). Denote by A i,j the (i, j)th element of a matrix A. Vec(A) stands for the vectorization of an m × n matrix A, which is the mn × 1 column vector obtained by stacking the columns of the matrix A on top of one another. For example, for an m × n matrix A, we have Vec(A)
denotes the L 2 form of a vector. To be specific, for a vector
II. PROBLEM SETUP
In this section, system structure under deception attacks is illustrated and problem of interests are presented.
A. SYSTEM STRUCTURE OF A CPS UNDER DECEPTION ATTACKS
In this subsection, system structure under deception attacks will be introduced. There are six components in our model, that is, physical process, smart sensor, attacker, wireless channel, bad measurement detector and remote estimator.
1) PHYSICAL PROCESS
Considering that signals contaminated by multiplicative noises is very common, similar to [28] and [29] , the process is modelled by a discrete linear time-invariant system with additive and multiplicative noises as follows:
where k ∈ N is the number of time instant, x k ∈ R n is the system state vector, y k ∈ R m is the vector of sensor measurement, α k ∈ R 1 , β k ∈ R n and γ k ∈ R m are zero-mean independent identically distributed (i. i. d) Gaussian noises with covariances L ≥ 0, M ≥ 0 and N ≥ 0, respectively. α k is multiplicative noise, β k and γ k are additive noises. Assume that x 0 is with zero mean and covariance matrix 0 ≥ 0, and is independent of α k , β k and γ k for all k ≥ 0. Remark 1: Modeling a system with multiplicative noises is natural in the real world. The multiplicative noise is useful VOLUME 6, 2018 to model the phenomena such as channel fading, or reflection of the transmitted signal from the ionospheric channel. For example, a stochastic system is illustrated as follows [30] :
where v(k) is LTI static state feedback control signal, i. e., v(k) = Fx(k) and κ(k) is a multiplicative noise generated by a fading channel. Eq. (3) can be converted to the form of Eq. (1) in this paper.
2) SMART SENSOR
In this paper, smart sensor is adopted, which is similar to that of [23] . Compared with other type of sensors, smart sensors can provide extra functions such as signal processing, alarm functions beyond those necessary for generating the measured quantity to improve system performance. Thus, similar to [23] , we assume that the smart sensor first locally estimates the state x k according to the process measurement and then the remote estimator employs the data package through a wireless channel. Due to the effect of multiplicative noise, the classical Kalman filter cannot be used. One needs to derive the Kalman filter for systems (1)- (2) . Define Y k {y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y k }. Define a priori minimum mean-squared error (MMSE) estimate and associated error covariances aŝ
and a posteriori MMSE estimate and its associated error covariance asx
Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Considering the system (1)- (2), the Kalman filter can be given as:
The proof is presented in the Appendix. Lemma 2: The recursion operator (9) is stable if and only if
where
The proof is shown in the Appendix. Assume that Eq. (10) is satisfied and lim
Define the Lyapunov and Riccati operator
The above equations equal to the Lyapunov and Riccati equations in [31] . It is well known that the error covariance of the Kalman filter will converge when (A, Q ) is stable, and (A, C) is detectable, for any initial condition [31] . Thus, let
In this paper, one has the following assumptions. Assumption 1: (A, Q ) is stable, and (A, C) is detectable. Assumption 2: Eq. (10) is satisfied. Assumption 3: Suppose that the Kalman filter starts from the steady-state, that is, 0 =P.
Remark 2: In this paper, the assumptions are commonly used in cyber security problem of a CPS, see e.g. [20] , [23] . We need the Assumptions 1 and 2 to ensure the stability of the Kalman filter.
From Assumption 3, let
3) BAD MEASUREMENT DETECTOR
A bad measurement detector should be introduced to monitor the system behavior to detect whether there are malicious attacks, meter failures and so on. There are various kinds of bad measurement detector in the literature. One of the widely used bad measurement detector, which is proposed by power system researchers, is to use the L 2 -norm of the measurement residual, i. e., the difference between the vector of observed measurements and the vector of estimated measurements z k y k − Cx − k , to detect the presence of bad measurements [22] . To be specific, ||y k − Cx − k || 2 is compared with a threshold τ and the detector triggers an alarm if
Since there are noises in this paper, by considering the stochastic nature of system (1)- (2), we use the bad measurement detection criterion in the following form:
where τ is the threshold. H 0 means that the system is operating normally, while H 1 means that the system is abnormal, i.e, the detector triggers alarm if
B. PROBLEM OF INTERESTS
In this paper, assume that there is an attacker who wants to attack the system by intercepting and modifying the transmitted data to degrade the estimation performance. We assume that the invader is able to know all the relevant messages passing between the sensor and the remote estimator and can inject new ones. The attack scheme we use is a linear attack proposed by [23] , which is a kind of integrity attack.
Since the integrity attack does not undermine the integrity of data, it is stealthier and much more difficult to detect the attack. However, the integrity attack can degrade the system performance. Thus, to study how an attacker launches an integrity attack is meaningful. Specifically, the linear attack strategy studied in this paper is described as follows
where D ∈ R m×m is an arbitrary matrix and denote byD = D − I , ξ k ∈ R m is zero-mean i. i. d. Gaussian noise with covariance Q ≥ 0 and is independent of z k . Furthermore, η k ∈ R 1 , which is independent of z k with Pr{η k = 1} = k and Fig. 1 for the system structure under a malicious attack. FIGURE 1. System structure. The attacker has the ability to interrupt a wireless channel to tamper the data z k and send a false onez k to the remote estimator without being detected by the bad measurement detector, which will degrade the remote estimation performance.
Remark 3:
In this paper, the attacker sendsz k instead of
k is the measurement residual) to the remote estimator to attack the system and degrade the system performance.
Remark 4: Note that when η k = 0, we havez k = z k , which represents the invader cannot modify the transmitted data at time k. If η k = 1, we havez k = Dz k + ξ k , which means that the attacker can launch an attack and tamper the transmitted data at time k. Thus, Pr{η k = 1} = k and Pr{η k = 0} = 1 − k represent the probability of modifying the transmitted data successfully and unsuccessfully at time k, respectively.
To quantify the estimation quality, similar to [20] and [23] , the following cost function is introduced
whereP k is the estimation error covariance under attack (15) . Since the objective of an attacker is to degrade the system performance as much as possible, the attacker needs to maximize the cost function (16) . To summarize, the main problems that we are interested in consist of the following: 1) How to design the attack strategy such that the attacker is undetectable to the bad measurement detector.
2) How to launch an optimal attack, i. e., maximize the cost function (16) .
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we will first analyze how the attacker launches an attack, however, he/she is not detected by the bad measurement detector. Then, we will propose the optimal attack strategy for the attacker who wants to maximize estimation error.
A. FEASIBLE ATTACK
In this subsection, the feasibility of launching a linear attack (15) without being detected by the bad measurement detector (14) will be analyzed. The following lemma is given to show how to bypass the bad measurement detector.
Lemma 3: The following inequality holds
for an invader launching a linear attack (15) without being detected by the bad measurement detector (14) , where P CPC T + N . Proof: From Eq. (14), if one wants not to be detected, the inequality
It can be verified that
where P CPC T + N . The above equality is satisfied since
Note that 
It can be derived that tr(DPD T + Q − P) ≤ 0 from (20) . Remark 5: If k ≡ 1, i.e., the attacker can modify the transmitted data at any time instant, which implies thatz k = Dz k + ξ k , it must hold that
in order not to be detected by the bad measurement detector.
B. OPTIMAL ATTACK STRATEGY
In this subsection, we will give solutions to the problems of interests described by subsection II-B. We will study how to launch an optimal linear attack (15), which maximize the trace of the estimation error covariance (16) to degrade the system performance without being detected by the bad measurement detector (14) . Note that in Eq. (16), tr(P k ) is only related to the matrixD (D), thus, we use J (D) (J (D)) to replace Eq. (16) . Since it has been analyzed that the attacker should satisfy condition (17) in order to bypass the bad measurement detector (14) , to give the optimal attack strategy is to solve the following optimization problem for the case that k ≡ 1.
Problem 1:
Similarly, for k ≡ 1, the following optimization problem is considered.
Problem 2:
To study the above mentioned optimization problems, we will calculate the estimation error covarianceP k under
The priori MMSE and posteriori MMSE of the remote estimator under attack denoted byx − k andx k , respectively, can be calculated asx
where K is the fixed gain given in (13) . Then, one has the following theorem. Theorem 1: For the system (1)-(2) under the attackz k = η k (Dz k + ξ k ) + z k , the following recursion can be given to calculate the estimation error covariance at the remote estimator
Proof: The proof is shown in the Appendix. When k ≡ 1, i.e., the attack isz k = Dz k + ξ k , one has the following Corollary.
Corollary 1: For the system (1)-(2) under the attackz k = Dz k + ξ k , the following recursive formula can be given to calculate the estimation error covariance at the remote estimator
When obtaining the error covariance (24) and (25), we use the steady-state assumption, i.e.,x
Finally, in order to study the optimal control strategy of the attacker, we give some preliminaries about DC programming problem.
Definition 1 ( [32] Difference of Convex Functions (DC Functions
)): Let f : R n → R, where f is a real-valued function. Then, if there exist convex functions, g, h : R n → R such that f can be decomposed as the difference between g and f: f (x) = g(x)−h(x), ∀x ∈ R n , f is called a DC function.
Definition 2 ( [32] DC Programming Problems):
A DC programming problem is given by
Then, we give the following theorem to solve Problem 1. Theorem 2: For the linear attackz k = η k (Dz k + ξ k ) + z k , the optimal attack strategy can be given by solving the following DC programming problem
The proof is presented in the Appendix. Now, we will consider Problem 2. The following Theorem is given.
Theorem 3: For the linear attackz k = Dz k + ξ k , the optimal attack strategy can be given by solving the following DC programming problem
The proof is shown in the Appendix. Remark 7: In Theorems 3 and 2, the optimal solutions can be obtained by solving DC programming problems (27) and (26), respectively. In fact, the DC programming problem has been discussed in the literatures for several years and many results about the solutions of DC programming problems have been obtained, see e.g. [33] - [35] . We can use the methods discussed above to solve the DC programming problems (27) and (26) .
Remark 8: The proposed result has some limitations. For example, the effect of delay is not considered. In addition, if we use another detector, the results proposed in this paper is not valid.
IV. EXAMPLE
In this section, an example is given to show the theoretical results. Consider system (1)- (2) with A = 0.5, B = 0.6, C = M = N = L = Q = 1, P − 0 = 0 = 0. By using Theorem 3 and solving the DC programming problem, it can be obtained that the optimal attack strategy is D = −0.8226. In order to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method, we compare the system performance under an optimal, a random attack strategy and without an attack, respectively, see Fig. 2 , where the random attack policy is the one who satisfies the condition (21) . It is shown that by using the optimal attack strategy proposed in this paper, the attacker degrades the system performance more than the random one and no attack. 
V. CONCLUSION
A linear attack has been proposed for a CPS with multiplicative noise. The feasibility of launching such an attack to guarantee that the attacker can successfully bypass a bad measurement detector has been analyzed. The recursion of the error covariance under the proposed attack has been provided. The optimal strategies for the proposed attack have been analyzed through DC programming problems. Finally, an example has been given to show the theoretical results.
In this paper, in order to give defensive measures, the proposed results are discussed from the perspective of an attacker. However, how to give defensive measure is not referred to, which is one possible future topic. For example, we can discuss a detection problem to detect the deception attack by improving the detector.
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APPENDIX
The proof of Lemma 1 is as follows. The proof of this section is similar to that of [36] .
Proof: It can be calculated that
We can obtain the following recursion operator:
Then,
In order to derive the equation for the Kalman filter, we first find an equation to compute a posterior state estimatex k , which is a linear combination of a priori estimatex − k and a weighted difference between an actual measurement y k and a measurement prediction Cx
The difference y k − Cx (28) is called the measurement innovation, or the residual. The n×m matrix K k is the gain or blending factor that minimizes VOLUME 6, 2018 one has
Since for matrices A and B with appropriate dimensions, it can be seen that tr(A) = tr(A T ), tr(AB) = tr(BA), dtr(AB) dB = A T and dtr(ABA T ) dA = A(B + B T ). One can derive that
Letting dtr(P k ) dK k = 0, one can obtain
which minimizes tr(P k ). Substituting (30) into (29), it can be obtained that
Proof of Lemma 2 is as follows. Proof: From Eq. (9), it can be calculated that
where we have used the property Vec(ABC) = (C T ⊗ A)Vec(B) to obtain the first equality.
Due to the linear control theory together with the above linear system (31), we can draw the conclusion.
The proof of Theorem 1 is as follows.
Proof: From Eq. (1)- (2) and the iteration of state estimate (22)- (23), it can be proved that
The error covariance at the remote estimator side can be calculated as
where the calculation of E[z kz
T k ] can be derived from (18) . In order to give the last two terms of (32), we first calculate
and
where the last equality is due to the steady-state assumptioñ x
we have
SinceP is the unique positive semi-definite fixed point of h•g, by using mathematical induction, we havē
where the last equality is due to (34) . VOLUME 6, 2018 Note that
Thus, we havẽ
This completes the proof.
The proof of Theorem 2 is as follows.
Proof: According to the recursion of the error covariance (24), we havẽ
Ignoring the constant terms of (35), at time k, maximizing tr(P k ) is equivalent to minimizing
where the last equality holds true is due to 
Note that tr(2CP(A T
is a DC function. Thus, Problem 1 is equivalent to solving the following DC programming problem
This completes the Proof. The proof of Theorem 3 is as follows.
Proof: According to Eq. (25), by using mathematical induction, one has
Ignoring the constant terms of (36), at time k, maximizing tr(P k ) is equivalent to miniminzing
Since tr(A T ) = tr(A), tr(AB) = tr(BA) and tr(ABC) = tr(CAB), one has Since for an m × n matrix A, we have
where A i,j is the (i, j)th element of the matrix A. Thus,
where the last inequality holds true due to the triangle inequality of a norm. Thus, ||A i KDP 
